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ABSTRACT
The connection of cables from offshore wind parks to interconnection lines is receiving growing 
attention in Europe. Although important technical breakthroughs are enabling transmission 
system operators (TSOs) to engage in such hybrid forms of architecture, substantial regulatory 
challenges are preventing progress.
Anchored in current European legal frameworks and targets, this paper reviews the national 
framework conditions that treat the development of transmission grids as regulated assets, 
focusing on the distribution of connection costs, the access grid tariff and the investment 
incentives faced by TSOs. The paper develops an ideal regulatory framework and compares it to 
the current regulations in countries around the Baltic Sea in order to assess their suitability for 
supporting Meshed Offshore Grids (MOGs). 
The results of this paper highlight the heterogeneity of national regulatory frameworks and the 
deviations from our recommendations. It is found that Germany lives up to the recommendations 
best, followed by Denmark, which suggests they have the regulatory potential to pioneer a MOG 
project in the Baltic Sea region. This is followed by consideration of two clusters of countries 
defined by their proximity to the ideal framework, assuming a three-step development of MOGs, 
and following ever more progressive regulatory adjustments. 
1. Introduction
Offshore Wind (OW) energy is expected to play a cen-
tral role in decarbonising future energy systems. 25 GW 
of cumulated OW capacity will be connected to 
European grids by 2020 [1], [2], supported by techno-
logical improvements and cost reductions in manufac-
turing wind turbines [3]. In the Baltic Sea, simulations 
show that total installed OW capacity will be multiplied 
nine-fold between 2016 and 2030 [2] in response to 
favourable wind energy conditions, shallow waters, low 
tides and wave height. With respect to the European 
transmission grid, overall investment costs are expected 
to reach EUR 125-140 billion by 2030 and up to 
420 billion by 2050 if European decarbonisation targets 
are to be met [4]. 
Advanced infrastructure solutions using the comple-
mentarity between subsea interconnectors and offshore 
wind farms (OWF), such as Meshed Offshore Grids 
(MOGs), have been examined to address the investment 
challenge in a context of decarbonisation. A MOG is a 
hybrid infrastructure combining OW farms connected to 
the transmission system with cross-border interconnec-
tions, as opposed to radial connection to a single 
 country’s market and interconnectors.
The main argument in favour of MOGs is that they 
increase the value of both the interconnector and the 
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wind park, benefiting from the synergies from the 
dual-purpose infrastructure. MOG architecture reduces 
OW park connection costs significantly and improves 
grid utilisation rates. Connection costs in a radial con-
nection line account for between 10% and 30% of the 
total project cost, depending on distance to the shore, 
and are only in use 40% of the time, which corresponds 
to the average load factor of OW energy [5], [6]. In the 
Kriegers Flak project, which connects several OWFs to 
an interconnector linking Denmark, Germany and ini-
tially Sweden, the feasibility study showed that this 
combined solution increases cable use from 36% up to 
79% [7]. The latest pre-feasibility study for integrated 
offshore grids in the Baltic Sea also stresses the great 
economic potential of hybrid solutions in a context 
of high offshore wind development [8]. Recent innova-
tions in HVDC technologies also support hybrid 
architecture [9]. Ultimately, social dynamics provide an 
additional driver for MOG as current acceptability issues 
push OW projects further away from shore [2].
In spite of these benefits, the development of hybrid 
forms of architecture is still being significantly under-
mined by regulatory barriers. It is therefore critical to 
identify these barriers and lift them prior to engaging in 
future development [10]. The objective of this paper is to 
assess qualitatively the gap between current regulation 
and MOG-friendly regulation in the Baltic Sea Region 
(BSR) countries of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. While past stud-
ies have reviewed the perception of risks or the support-
ive regulatory set ups for wind developers [12]–[16], or 
the regulatory barriers to system operation or the admin-
istrative and legal processes associated with hybrid 
 networks or offshore wind farms [17]–[22], this study 
focuses on the regulatory framework affecting  invest- 
ments in MOG for TSOs. 
In the North Sea context, [23] estimate that the cost 
allocation of the new infrastructure involves a critical 
risk for project development. The first large scale project 
investigating new regulatory frameworks for hybrid off-
shore infrastructure in Europe, NSCOGI, identified the 
main incompatibilities in regulatory frameworks [20], 
[24]. They include misalignments in the distribution of 
roles and responsibilities among the different actors and 
the coexistence of different technical rules affecting 
project coordination in the planning, financing and con-
struction phases. The financing and the construction 
phase are particularly affected by the set of rules that 
frame the regulated recovery of grid expenses across 
countries and the potentially uneven financial risks faced 
by the TSOs involved in a joint project.
Building on past research, this study identifies three 
key regulatory factors that affect joint investment in net-
work infrastructure in a MOG context, namely the con-
nection cost distribution, the generation grid tariff and 
the investment incentives for grid development. In 
anchoring our analysis into current European targets for 
competitive and sustainable energy systems, this study 
qualitatively reviews the regulatory factors to define 
good practices. The good practices constitute an ideal 
framework that the regulatory set-up existing in the 
countries of the BSR is compared to. The outcome of the 
study provides indications on how to adjust current reg-
ulation and draws a stepwise approach to future MOG in 
the Baltic Sea using a policy and regulatory viewpoint. 
This paper advocates using a super shallow method-
ology in the construction of the offshore infrastructure 
and argues for a grid access charge that only reflects the 
operating costs derived from the generator’s use of sys-
tem (energy charge). Regarding the investment incen-
tives, a MOG-friendly incentive package should at least 
address investment incentives for innovation and R&D 
specifically. Thus, encouraging innovative CAPEX 
while also incentivising least-cost spending on control-
lable investment projects, and coupling the TSO’s profit 
to the expected MOG benefits. 
Section 2 describes the regulatory framework condi-
tions that support regional investment in MOGs. Section 
3 sets out an ideal regulatory framework and compares 
it to existing regulations in the BSR in order to assess the 
extent to which country regulations support MOG devel-
opment. Section 4 discusses the policy implications of 
our findings, and Section 5 offers conclusions. 
2. Key regulatory barriers
Current regulatory set ups are not meant to provide the 
TSOs incentives to invest in MOGs [25]. Far from 
claiming that the regulatory challenges are the only 
factors hampering MOG, this lack of adapted frame-
work contributes to slowing down the path of develop-
ment. To obtain a more accurate picture, other criteria 
such as the business potential for OW investment have 
to be included too. In a recent feasibility study assess-
ing the costs and benefits for two distinct cases of 
MOG in the BSR [21], shows that the economic 
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From a pure market perspective, the OW developers 
should pay for the extra costs they incur to the transmis-
sion system. Accordingly, a shallow method should 
apply where the system is not stressed, while a deep 
approach should be used at congested nodes [33]. From 
a more practical perspective, the investment risks asso-
ciated with the connection costs create a strong disincen-
tive for project developers to invest, questioning the 
relevance of the pure market-based approach in a con-
text of transition [34]. 
Besides, deep and shallow approaches raise several 
concerns in hybrid architecture involving interconnec-
tors [35]. The deep approach adds a layer of complexity 
across countries, raising an issue with the requirements 
for transparency set out in the RES Directive [36]. This 
approach is also inconsistent with Electricity Market 
Regulation (EC) No. 714/2009 [38] specifying TSOs as 
the only responsible entity for investments in cross- 
border interconnections, and further emphasising the 
importance of the legal definition given to the hybrid 
infrastructure. In the case of shallow cost sharing, the 
legal question to address is where the interconnection 
and the OWF connection cable start and terminate, 
which is likely to give rise to differences in interpreta-
tion and to dampen the completion of hybrid projects. 
The connection methodology used in MOGs should be 
identical regardless of the transmission system’s owner 
in order to avoid discrimination. 
2.2. Grid access charges for generators
The European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) identified greater harmonisation of 
grid access tariff design across national regulations as an 
additional step towards integrated electricity markets, 
provided that transmission tariff designs promote eco-
nomic efficiency [39], [40]. In the case of MOGs, the 
legal definition of the infrastructure itself and the diver-
sity of the economic signals sent by the national grid 
access tariffs are two important limitations.
The tariff must comply with non-discriminatory cri-
teria [30] and must take into account the restrictions 
arising from the legal definition of the grid infrastruc-
ture (connection cable and interconnector) in the 
hybrid architecture. According to Regulation 714/2009 
and Commission Regulation (EU) No. 838/2010 [41], 
applying an access fee to a European interconnector is 
contrary to the law. The access tariff for OW parks in a 
MOG is therefore limited to the connection to the inter-
connector through a connection cable.
 benefits of this solution outperform the total cost of a 
traditional  infrastructure scenario if sufficient genera-
tion capacity is connected. This  optimization study 
assumes no regulatory barriers hamper the project and 
indicates the higher end of the benefit potentials that 
can be unlocked when a MOG-friendly regulation 
applies in the given wind development conditions. 
Taking its point of departure in a number of existing 
studies [20], [23], [26]–[28], this paper pinpoints three 
key aspects of the regulation that constitutes critical bar-
riers to MOG development. 
• Distribution of connection costs;
• Grid access charges;
• The set of incentive instruments for recovering 
grid costs. While the incentive instruments have 
been studied within the context of the developing 
European electricity market [29], this paper 
argues that a similar approach can be used in the 
case of MOGs.
2.1. Distribution of connection costs
MOGs combine cross-border interconnectors, which 
are paid for by TSOs pursuant to Directive 2009/72/
EC, with connection infrastructure, where the rules for 
cost distributions between TSOs and OW developers 
are specific to each country. In the case of renewables, 
and in particular OW, these costs are significantly 
higher than those for connecting traditional power 
plants because of their resource-dependency [31]. 
Accordingly, the rules that apply regarding how con-
nection costs are distributed between TSO and OW 
developer will directly affect the commercial viability 
of OW projects.
The methodology for sharing the costs of a new 
connection line distinguishes three broad approaches: 
super-shallow, shallow or deep. The full responsibility 
for bearing the expansion and reinforcement costs 
goes from the TSO in the supper-shallow case to the 
wind developer in the deep case and is shared in the 
shallow case.
The shallow and deep approaches give a locational 
signal in linking the connection costs to the physical 
expansion of the network. These approaches drive cost 
efficiencies from a system-planning perspective, but 
they also create significant system access difficulties for 
resource-dependent power plants [32], potentially result-
ing in a trade-off between the least-cost location in terms 
of network development and the optimal location in 
terms of wind conditions. 
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• Capital-intensive: covering the investment risk 
should be prioritised while keeping overall 
expenditure low; 
• Innovative: limited information will be available 
to both parties; 
• Capable of unlocking large efficiency gains at 
the system level (eg. reduced back-up, limited 
price volatility, accelerate CO2 reductions etc.).
Cost plus regulation is the basis of rate-making. This 
regime allows the expenses registered in the regulated 
asset base (RAB) to be fully covered by the tariff while 
granting the operator a ‘fair’ rate of return (RoR) as 
profit [46]. The main characteristic of this regime is that 
it secures revenue adequacy while being criticised for its 
over-investment effect [47]. 
Current regulatory regimes were developed in 
response to over-capacity in infrastructure, their main 
objective being to achieve efficiency gains. The main 
incentive instruments they introduce, namely price and 
revenue caps and performance-based regulation (PBR), 
have been aimed primarily at limiting moral hazard and 
increasing productive efficiency and quality of service 
while attempting to enhance allocative efficiency in 
introducing rent-sharing mechanisms [46]–[53]. The 
combination of these instruments is theoretically appro-
priate for driving costs down and maintaining a high 
quality of service. However, the practical implementa-
tions of the incentive package may deviate from effec-
tively bringing costs down, especially the capital costs, 
and from supporting innovative solutions, making it 
poorly suited to triggering MOG investments as devel-
oped hereinafter.
Empirically it can be observed that the incentive 
instrument (also known as the efficiency or X-factor) 
usually only applies to the controllable operation expen-
ditures (OPEX), leaving the capital expenditures 
(CAPEX) out of the incentive mechanism. The CAPEX 
continue to be regulated following a cost-plus scheme 
and continue to generate profit. This has three main 
implications. The financial risk associated with capital 
investment is minimised, which supports large invest-
ments, including in MOGs. Nevertheless, without any 
specific driver to appropriately reward the extra risk 
incurred by new technical and organisational solutions, 
the TSOs will tend to favour business as usual invest-
ments. For example, the higher financial risk associated 
with CAPEX in MOG is due to the project’s novelty and 
the limited information leading to a higher risk of cost 
overruns and inaccurate ex-ante cost estimates. Besides, 
Since each utility presents different regulated asset 
bases, depreciation rates and grid development plans, 
implementing a common fixed charge is poorly relevant. 
Harmonisation should consequently be sought on the 
tariff design rather than the tariff level. The grid access 
tariff is made to recoup the investment (capital) costs 
and the utilisation (operating) costs of the grid infra-
structure. It is usually represented as a two-part tariff, 
including a fixed charge and an energy charge that is 
paid as a function of the energy consumed or produced. 
It is set by the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) 
and varies between the different European countries 
[42], [43], resulting in as many different signals [44] that 
impact on OW investors’ perceptions of risk and profit 
[45] . At the MOG, this situation may influence location 
choice based on whose TSO offers the most advanta-
geous grid use conditions. Ultimately, un-harmonised 
tariff designs in a MOG may discriminate against some 
operators and, even more so, differentiate grid utilisation 
between the different users.
Regulation (EU) No. 838/2010 [41] took the first step 
towards a convergence in tariff designs, since it sets a 
cap on the energy component within the tariff of between 
0 and 0.5 EUR/MWh, approximating to the real value of 
the operating costs l. However, many disparities across 
countries remain, for example, regarding whom the tariff 
should apply to: the consumers only, or both consumers 
and producers? The tariff designs also differ widely. 
While some countries use only an energy-based cost 
component to cover the grid costs (Denmark), others use 
multi-part tariffs combining the energy component with 
capacity-based cost components (Belgium, France) or 
send locational (congestion) signals (Sweden). 
2.3. Investment incentives 
As pointed out in the promotion project, ‘A meshed off-
shore grid will be achieved by the joint investment in 
transmission lines, as is the case for interconnectors 
nowadays’ [28]. 
Investments in electricity networks are made by TSOs 
in response to binding legal obligations (e.g. to achieve 
interconnection targets or connect renewable energies) 
and to a set of regulatory incentives. The incentives con-
sist of instruments and mechanisms that constitute the 
regulatory package used by NRAs to review and monitor 
the TSO’s expenses and to incentivise good practices. A 
MOG-friendly incentive instrument package should be 
designed taking the characteristics of such investments 
into account, which can be summarised as being: 
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 25 2020 37
Bergaentzlé, Claire-Marie; Pade, Lise-Lotte; Truels Larsen and Lauge
incentive to develop future decarbonised networks 
and be non-discriminatory. It should also be easily 
implementable without requiring heavy bureaucratic 
adjustments from the NRAs. Accordingly, the 
super-shallow approach is preferred, since it avoids 
the risks and complexities associated with the legal 
definition of the assets, and because of its lower 
financial risks from the OW development perspective. 
OW-friendly tariff designs for all generators regard-
less of their point of connection should apply an 
energy component only, complying with European 
requirements set forth in [41]. The generators would 
thereby pay for their own grid utilisation costs. 
Locational signals should be avoided in the tariff to 
avoid locational distortions, and the remaining fixed 
costs should be entirely socialised to the end-users. 
Finally, a MOG-friendly incentive package should at 
least address investment incentives for innovation and 
R&D, thus encouraging innovative CAPEX while 
also incentivising least-cost spending on controllable 
investment projects, and coupling the TSO’s profit to 
the expected MOG benefits.
3.2.  Empirical analysis
Most Baltic Sea countries, including all the Baltic States 
and Sweden, use a deep methodology for radial connec-
tion where the OW developer pays all the connection 
and reinforcement costs [61]. Sweden is currently 
developing an agreement to shift all or part of the con-
nection costs from the OW developers to the Swedish 
TSO, but the final framework is still under discussion [62]. 
Poland and Finland use a shallow approach. Currently 
the export cable from the OWF to the grid connection 
node is not considered a transmission system in Poland 
and the OW developer is responsible for this part. 
Current the division of responsibility is such that the 
investor builds the export cable including a substation if 
needed, the export infrastructure is connected to a grid 
connection point owned by the TSO. If necessary, the 
onshore grid and the grid connection station are rein-
forced by the TSO. In Finland, the OW developer bears 
the costs for the construction of its own power cable and 
any additional structures needed to enable the connec-
tion to the network. If another connection is constructed 
to the same switchyard during the following ten years, 
the connection fee paid by the wind power developer is 
partly reimbursed. The shallow approach also applies in 
Denmark for open-door procedures and near-shore proj-
ects. Only in the Kriegers Flak and Horns Rev 3 projects 
leaving all CAPEX, including the routine expansion and 
reinforcement activities out of the incentive mechanism 
in a context of a network investment boom is likely to 
result in a substantial rise in the tariff paid by the rate-
payers. The simple socialisation of CAPEX should 
accordingly be completed by introducing additional 
incentive mechanisms directed at both limiting the 
uncontrolled rise of spending, and supporting innova-
tive investment choices in distinguishing between con-
trollable and non-controllable CAPEX and using 
different RoRs [54], [55]. The financial risk should be 
reflected in the remuneration of these specific assets 
using a specific reward (e.g. increased Weighted Average 
Capital Cost (WACC) or premium) without resulting in 
an increase in other categories of CAPEX that are 
deemed controllable.
As regulated firms, network operators may have little 
incentive to conduct R&D activities, and empirical stud-
ies show a decline in research spending since the unbun-
dling reforms [56], [57]. As with CAPEX, R&D costs 
should be authorised and targeted [58]. 
The PBR instruments that apply to OPEX target 
short-term reliability targets such as the reduction of 
outages and only capture the benefits expected from 
MOGs to a limited extent. Developing new perfor-
mance-based indicators [59] that couple profit-making 
to MOG benefits would encourage investments in 
meshed architecture. In California, for example, incen-
tive mechanisms were developed to support investments 
in smart grids and demand flexibility [60]. Similar per-
formance-based indicators could be constructed to asso-
ciate MOG benefits with TSOs’ profits.
3. The ideal regulatory framework and the 
Baltic Sea countries 
This section compares the current regulations of the 
Baltic Sea countries with the ideal framework and iden-
tifies regulatory gaps.
3.1. Criteria for evaluation
A regulatory framework is considered a driver to 
MOG when it facilitates the deployment of decarbon-
ized energy sources in internalizing the investment 
risks associated with their resource-dependency 
nature, while limiting market distortions in the region 
across technologies and actors. Especially, a support-
ive set of rules must be established in accordance with 
the European legal framework, should give the right 
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 locational and only account for seasonal changes. In 
Sweden, the capacity charge is dominant and is comple-
mented with a locational component that supports con-
nections to the least stressed networks. For feed-ins, 
charges are higher in the northernmost location, whereas 
for consumption the converse applies: that is, the charges 
are the highest in the southernmost part of the country. 
In addition, all the Scandinavian countries receive 
exemptions from Regulation (EU) No. 838/2010 [41] 
(see 2.2) and can apply an energy charge of up to 
1.2 EUR/MWh.
Finally, all eight countries in this study use different 
incentive packages. Estonia and Poland use a cost-plus 
regulation in which all authorised Total (OPEX+CAPEX) 
Expenditures (TOTEX), including those for research, 
are passed through in the tariffs, no cost-efficiency 
requirement applies to the CAPEX, and no separate 
treatment applies to the different items of expenditure. 
Performance instruments are absent from the Estonian 
regulation, while the Polish regulator decided to remove 
its performance targets in 2017. 
Latvia and Finland both also authorise the passing 
through of CAPEX in the tariffs and use a hybrid regu-
lation aimed at supporting capital investments and the 
modernisation of specific quality-related assets respec-
tively. The Latvian regulator linked the TSO’s revenue 
to a financial penalty of 10% from the previous year’s 
net turnover if the latter fails to match grid development 
forecasts, especially concerning new connections. 
Latvia also uses a set of performance incentives directed 
at reducing interruptions of supply [63]. The Finnish 
regulation incentivises improvements in quality of ser-
vice in using a 0% X-factor applying to OPEX (thereby 
removing the incentive for cost reductions) and in 
(tendered projects), a super-shallow approach is used 
where Energinet.dk bears the costs of grid connection to 
the offshore connection point. The super-shallow 
approach is also used by the two German TSOs having 
access to the coastline (Tennet and 50Hertz). The 
German regulatory framework (Energiewende) is partic-
ularly favourable to the development of wind energy 
since it provides that in the context of tendering, the OW 
developer receives compensation when no connection is 
available at the time of commissioning. Given the legal 
obligations, TSOs have demanded a framework (laid out 
in the O-NEP and the Bundesfachplan Offshore) for 
long-term OW planning and connection that facilitates 
their connection activities and mitigate the potential 
excess cost due to low coordination.
Grid access tariffs for generators in the BSR only 
apply in the three Scandinavian countries [43]. In the 
other countries, producers do not pay for using the grid. 
Different signals therefore apply between the group of 
countries using a tariff and the others, and different sig-
nals also apply between the Scandinavian countries, 
since they all use different tariff levels (relative share 
paid by the consumer and the generators) and tariff 
designs (Table 1). As for the tariff level, the relative 
share of the cost of network access paid by the Danish 
producers amount to 3% (against 97% paid by the 
end-users). In Finland and Sweden, this distribution is 
19% and 36%, respectively paid by the producers and 
the rest socialized to the consumers. The tariff design in 
Denmark is entirely based on an energy component. For 
each unit of energy fed into the network, the producers 
pay a fixed fee to the TSO. In Finland and Sweden a 
capacity charge also applies. Finland has a point- 
of- connection approach, but price signals are not 
Table 1: TSO tariff characteristics in the BSR
Sharing of network operator charges
Locational signal
Tariff structure (%)
producer consumer capacity energy
Denmark 3% 97% no 0 100
Estonia 0% 100% n/r n/r n/r
Finland 19% 81% no 7 93
Germany 0% 100% no n/r n/r
Latvia 0% 100% n/r n/r n/r
Lithuania 0% 100% n/r n/r n/r
Poland 0% 100% n/r n/r n/r
Sweden 36% 64% yes 74 26
Source: [43]. Note: the split between the energy and capacity cost components reflects a base case computed by Entso-e for purposes of comparison. 
n/r = not relevant
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 tax-based funding. It is unclear how this change will 
affect the TSOs’ activities.
Finally, Germany uses a revenue cap regulation in 
which the efficiency incentive applies to all controllable 
TOTEX. Germany therefore applies a distinction 
between controllable and non-controllable CAPEX, the 
latter being considered strategic to the Energiewende 
(e.g. cost for interconnection, for renewables plant con-
nection and R&D) and being entirely passed on through 
the tariff. The TSOs’ eligible expenses must comply 
with several efficiency factors to receive a full return on 
equity. A common X-factor applies to the controllable 
TOTEX regardless of the operator, and an individual 
efficiency requirement set by international efficiency 
benchmarking tailors the efficiency objectives at each 
TSO level. Short-term quality performance objectives 
complete the mechanism. 
Table 2 summarises our ideal regulatory framework 
and shows the results of the different country bench-
marks. (+) indicates that the regulatory framework in a 
country is in line with our recommendations. (o) indi-
cates that the regulatory framework needs to be slightly 
improved. Finally (-) indicates that the regulatory frame-
work is a barrier to investing in MOGs. 
The above comparison stresses the heterogeneity of 
the framework conditions among the Baltic Sea 
countries and shows that some countries are closer than 
others to having a MOG-friendly regulatory set-up. 
authorising the continuation of depreciation for the 
early replacement of strategic assets for quality. Finland 
also uses a dedicated innovation incentive granting up to 
1% of the total annual turnover in R&D activities, 
encompassing new technologies, knowledge or operat-
ing methods [63]. 
Sweden and Lithuania fully cover all CAPEX and use 
an incentive regulation with a 1% X-factor on controlla-
ble OPEX.1 In both countries financial incentives are 
used to improve the quality of delivery. Lithuania in 
particular significantly increased its capital spending 
(+67% between 2013 and 2014 [64]), while the NRA 
supports future investments for grid expansion, recon-
struction and reinforcement [65].
Denmark uses a cost-plus regulation on its TOTEX 
and applies a return on capital based on the inflation rate 
[54], meaning that the TSO’s profit is not coupled to its 
regulated asset base, and leaving market conditions to 
drive the TSO’s investment choices. The authorised 
TOTEX are entirely passed through in the tariff without 
explicit regulation of the quality of supply, nor any spe-
cific cost-efficiency or performance requirements [63]. 
Research, demonstration and development activities are 
currently funded through the network Public Service 
Obligation (PSO) charge. However, the PSO is expected 
to be fully phased out by 2022 and to be replaced by 
1
  Lithuania uses a special hybrid incentive cap scheme with a 50/50 price/
revenue cap.
Table 2: Country overview of framework conditions
Regulatory 
framework 
condition Good practices 
 D
enm
ark
 Estonia
 Finland
 G
erm
any
 Latvia
 Lithuania
 P
oland
 Sw
eden
Connection cost 
methodology
Super shallow cost recovery + – o + – – o –
Grid access tariff Energy-based tariff / no access fee for producers + + o + + + + –
MOG-friendly 
investment 
incentive 
Full recovery of R&D costs + + + + + + + +
Clear R&D incentive – – + + – – – –
Limits the financial risk on CAPEX + + + + + + + +
Specifically supports CAPEX – – o + + + – –
Limits CAPEX overspending o – – + – – – –
Incentive on OPEX/PBR – – o o o o – o
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Finland apply a regulation that actively supports R&D. 
Germany, Lithuania and Latvia specifically support 
CAPEX, as they encourage grid expansions for intercon-
nection and renewable energy sources connection. This 
situation also hides differences in how the expenditure 
items are treated and socialised. Finally, the regulatory 
schemes associated with OPEX, if any, are limited to 
duration and frequency interruption indicators and 
would require new indicators to be elaborated.
During the planning, development and operational 
phases, the transparent dissemination of good practices 
will be particularly critical in reducing information 
asymmetry for NRAs and supporting successful proj-
ects. Appropriate platforms should be introduced to 
share information in a transparent, reliable and unam-
biguous way. Pooling key competences and sharing 
expertise would also alleviate NRAs’ differences in 
terms of their respective human and financial resources. 
This would also support the compilation of harmonised 
data sets across countries, upon which new performance 
indicators adapted to MOG can be designed.
Other approaches to improving regional cooperation 
include increasing centralisation, for example, through 
the implementation of a regional Independent System 
Operator (ISO) [6] or a supra-national TSO [66], as well 
as setting up a strong European regulatory body [67]. 
The centralised option also has the advantage of limiting 
the prevalence of national interests in network expansion 
and is likely to assess competing alternatives more 
objectively. However, it also questions the notion of 
countries’ sovereignty. In either case, the alignment of 
regulatory frameworks assumes a strong commitment by 
NRAs, and beyond that by policy-makers, to use a 
regional scope that can potentially conflict with national 
interests [68], raising new questions regarding the bind-
ing power of European regulatory frameworks.
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This study has aimed to highlight the existence of regu-
latory barriers and to provide initial policy recommenda-
tions for how to bridge the gap between existing 
regulations and the regulatory framework that best sup-
ports the development of MOGs in the Baltic Sea. 
The ideal framework developed based on the qualita-
tive analysis performed on the key regulatory frame-
works affecting network investment, namely offshore 
wind connection, grid tariff design and transmission 
4. Discussion
It is important to note that, because the different mea-
sures are not ranked, the discussion is limited to how far 
or close the Baltic Sea countries are to having a consis-
tent, pro-MOG regulation.
Currently, only Germany lives up to the recommenda-
tions in this paper. German’s regulatory framework 
offers low risk for OW developers, minimizes market 
distortions, and supports location choices based on wind 
conditions, rather than least cost for the system. Looking 
at the grid connection and tariff only, Denmark also has 
suitable regulatory arrangements for connection and 
access fees. Efforts should therefore concentrate on 
implementing specific regulatory drivers to incentivise 
hybrid investments as developed hereafter. The connec-
tion and grid access conditions that apply in the rest of 
the BSR suggest that Poland and Finland need only 
minor adjustments to prioritise changes in their respec-
tive connection cost allocation methods, whereas the 
remaining countries, Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia, are lagging behind and will need to take greater 
steps to create homogeneous connection signals sup-
porting MOGs.
Alignment in connection frameworks will require 
strong ex-ante coordination mechanisms to be laid down 
at the regional level to offset the potential impact of the 
super-shallow approach on system costs. One possible 
way of addressing this is to set up a regional task force 
involving all relevant stakeholders: the NRAs, maritime 
spatial planners, TSOs and representatives of the wind 
sector with the role of identifying and selecting future 
OW park locations, network corridors and hubs based on 
available maritime lands, wind conditions and econom-
ics parameters for off- and onshore network investments.
The significant differences in different countries’ grid 
access tariffs suggest discrepancies among the TSOs, as 
well as a failure to create a level playing field at the 
regional level. This conclusion is not only valid in the 
BSR but also extends to all European countries. 
Regarding the investment incentive package set out in 
the TSOs’ cost recovery framework, the incentives for 
R&D spending and CAPEX are secured in all the coun-
tries, the main differences arising from specific drivers 
and, more rarely, from over-investment brakes on 
CAPEX. Most countries dedicate a certain budget to 
R&D activities, fixed as a certain level of the TSO’s 
turnover (usually 0.5%% to 1%). Only Germany and 
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 regulation. Lastly, the incentive instrument package is 
dominated by NRA decisions taken with limited politi-
cal interference and with no common framework from 
the layer of European governance. The harmonisation of 
incentive instruments is considered the most challenging 
because of this decentralised degree of governance, and 
this is likely to require the implementation of transna-
tional coordination platforms. In contrast, the alignment 
of grid access tariff signals may require the least effort, 
and the European countries’ commitment to the Paris 
Agreement should further encourage policy-makers to 
put VRE-friendly connection frameworks on top of the 
energy policy agenda. 
Confronting regulatory good practices with the vari-
ous regulations in the countries around the Baltic Sea 
shows how suitable or restrictive current frameworks 
may be in supporting OW development and investment 
in MOGs, allowing us to suggest country-specific solu-
tions. The comparison of regulatory frameworks also 
drives attention to similarities and discrepancies between 
the observed countries and highlights clusters of coun-
tries that share similar regulatory frameworks. Such 
groupings can be essential to successful hybrid projects, 
as they provide indications for which set of countries 
should be targeted first when initiating MOG projects, 
as well as insights to lay down adapted regulatory path-
ways for coordinated action. For example, Germany and 
Denmark have a supportive regulatory framework for 
MOGs and have rather similar regulatory arrangements, 
suggesting that the chances of success for a hybrid proj-
ect are likely to be higher between these two countries, 
as the Kriegers Flak project already tends to suggest. 
Assuming that the timings of regulatory adjustments are 
identical regardless of the regulatory barrier, as the 
remaining countries Latvia, Lithuania and Finland 
would enter into a second wave of development at a 
later stage.
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network incentive instruments were compared to the 
existing regulation in the countries of the BSR. This 
comparison allowed us to identify the regulatory gaps 
between the best theoretical practices and empirical 
observations and to make policy recommendations. 
Departing from the assumption that OW promotion is 
consistent with achieving European targets and the Paris 
Agreement, and using a transmission grid development 
perspective, the recommendations in this paper stipulate 
a line of action combining i) least financial risk for OW 
developers with respect to network infrastructure, and ii) 
a high degree of coordination in the methodologies used 
to set the distribution of connection costs, access grid 
tariff designs and investment incentives for the TSOs.
Using a single set of approaches for infrastructure 
cost allocations and grid designs on the meshed grid 
scale and beyond, at the level of a whole country’s terri-
tory, seems unavoidable in supporting unbiased develop-
ment. Eventually, a coordinated set of investment 
incentives adapted to hybrid projects will lead to optimal 
techno-economic choices and to cost-cutting. High-level 
coordination on the regional scale, facilitated by 
European jurisdiction, is advocated to initiate conver-
gence in the regulatory framework conditions of differ-
ent countries. 
The current lack of coordination in deciding the 
regulatory frameworks for network development 
between European countries arises from the latter’s 
different energy policies, which are themselves based 
on the subsidiarity principle set out in the European 
legal framework. This results in heterogeneous signals 
that distort investment choices and hinder the creation 
of a level playing field across countries. Nonetheless 
this level playing field, which should be constructed 
upon economically sound signals, is critical to the 
prospect of efficiently developing and operating shared 
 infrastructure. 
The different layers of governance involved in shap-
ing each of the three regulatory framework conditions 
are also likely to affect future adjustments. The grid 
access tariff signal is partially shaped by the European 
Regulation that gives a relatively common basis to all 
countries and is strongly influenced by political deci-
sions before finally being designed and implemented by 
the NRAs. The connection methodologies reflect above 
all the political support given to variable renewable 
energy before their translation into national grid 
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